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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2037 
___________ 
 
SANDRO RODRIGUEZ, 
Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A041-832-100) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 11, 2013 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR. and SHWARTZ , Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 16, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
2 
 Sandro Rodriguez, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, petitions for review 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition. 
 
I. 
 Rodriguez entered the United States in 1986 and later became a lawful permanent 
resident.  In 2003, he pleaded guilty in New Jersey state court to distribution of a controlled 
dangerous substance (cocaine), in violation of N.J. Stat. §§ 2C:35-5a(1) and 2C:35-5b(3).  He 
was sentenced to 90 days’ imprisonment and two years’ probation. 
 In light of that conviction, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated 
removal proceedings against Rodriguez, charging him with being removable for having been 
convicted of an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and a controlled 
substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Rodriguez conceded his removability and, 
after DHS denied his request for a favorable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, he applied for 
asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
 In November 2012, the IJ denied Rodriguez’s application.  The IJ began her analysis by 
finding that Rodriguez’s testimony was not credible, and that he had not corroborated his 
claim.  Next, the IJ determined that Rodriguez’s conviction rendered him ineligible for asylum, 
withholding of removal under the INA, and withholding of removal under the CAT.  Finally, 
the IJ rejected Rodriguez’s request for deferral of removal under the CAT, concluding that, 
even if his allegations were true, he had not established that he would likely be tortured if 
3 
removed to the Dominican Republic. 
 Rodriguez appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  In March 2013, the BIA dismissed the 
appeal.  In doing so, the BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed] the Immigration Judge’s 
determinations for the reasons stated in [her] decision,” while at the same time providing “brief 
comments for purposes of clarification.”  (A.R. at 3.) 
 Rodriguez now seeks review of the agency’s decision.1 
II. 
 Rodriguez’s brief does not challenge the agency’s determination that his conviction 
constitutes an aggravated felony under the INA.  Nor does his brief challenge the agency’s 
denial of his request for CAT relief.  Accordingly, those issues have been waived.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 
1994).  Furthermore, because an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony is ineligible 
for asylum, Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (b)(2)(B)(i)), Rodriguez’s waiver of the agency’s aggravated felony 
determination forecloses relief here with respect to his asylum claim. 
 All that is before us, then, is Rodriguez’s challenge to the agency’s denial of his request 
for withholding of removal under the INA.  “Individuals seeking to obtain [that relief] may not 
do so if they are deemed by the Attorney General to have committed a particularly serious 
crime.”  Lavira v. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 2007), overruled on other grounds by 
                                              
1
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where, as here, the BIA’s decision 
adopts and affirms the IJ’s decision, “we have authority to review both decisions.”  Hanif v. 
Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
4 
Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc); see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  
For the reasons set forth in the IJ’s decision, (see A.R. at 281-83), which the BIA adopted, we 
agree with the agency’s conclusion that Rodriguez’s conviction constituted a “particularly 
serious crime” for purposes of his claim for withholding of removal under the INA.  As a 
result, the agency did not err in denying that relief. 
 In light of the above, we will deny Rodriguez’s petition for review.  His request for oral 
argument is denied.   
 
